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I. INTRODUCTION 
The  General  Accounting  Office  estimates  the  cost 
of the  thrift  industry  bailout  to be  around  $150  billion. 
George  Benston,  professor  at  Emory  University, 
helps  his students  grasp the  immensity  of this number 
by  asking  them  to  imagine  how  hard  it is to become 
a millionaire.  He  then  asks them  to imagine  150,000 
millionaires  being  made  paupers  (NW  Yoz&  Times, 
6/10/90).  The  most  important  lesson  of  the  thrift 
debacle  is  the  need  to  close  insolvent  and  nearly 
insolvent  financial institutions  promptly  [Kane (1989); 
Bartholomew  (199 l)]. 
“Too  big  to  fail”  refers  to  the  practice  followed 
by  bank  regulators  of protecting  creditors  (uninsured 
as  well  as  insured  depositors  and  debt  holders)  of 
large  banks  from  loss  in the  event  of failure.  In  this 
article,  attention  is focused  on  the  resulting  transfer 
of  the  decision  to  close  a  troubled  bank  from  its 
creditors  to  bank  regulators.  The  paper  argues  that 
the  policy  of  too  big  to  fail  created  in  banking  the 
same  kinds  of  problems  of  timely  closure  that 
existed  in  the  thrift  industry. 
The  policy  of  too  big  to  fail  resulted  from  a 
fundamental  deficiency  in bankruptcy  arrangements 
for  banks.  In  banking  there  is  no  arrangement 
analogous  to  that  existing  for  nonfinancial  corpo- 
rations  unable  to  meet  their  debts,  where  the 
troubled  corporation  continues  to  operate  while  its 
creditors  determine  whether  it is viable.  It is usually 
undesirable  to  liquidate  a large  corporation  immedi- 
ately  following  a failure  to  pay  its  debts.  The  cor- 
poration  may  be  viable  if  restructured.  Also,  an 
orderly,  rather  than  an  immediate,  liquidation  can 
increase  the  salvageable  value  of its assets.  For  non- 
financial  corporations,  therefore,  Chapter  11 of the 
bankruptcy  law  provides  a procedure  under  which 
a  bankruptcy  judge  supervises  the  operation  of  a 
corporation  that  cannot  pay  its debts.  Creditors  and 
existing  management  then  negotiate  whether  to 
liquidate  or  restructure. 
Banks  are  not  subject  to  bankruptcy  law.  For 
banks,  there  is no  Chapter  11 administered  by  the 
courts.  In its absence,  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance 
Corporation  (FDIC)  and  the  Federal  Reserve  have 
come  to  run  an  informal  Chapter  11  for  banks. 
Particularly  since  the  early  198Os, deposit  insurance 
and  the  discount  window  have  been  used  to  keep 
in operation  banks  that  otherwise  would  have  been 
closed  by  the  market.  l This  arrangement  has  been 
useful  in that  it prevents  the  abrupt  closing  of large 
banks.  In  contrast  to  corporate  bankruptcy  pro- 
ceedings,  however,  the  decision  to  allow  a bank  to 
fail is made  by  public  officials  rather  than  the  bank’s 
creditors.  This  arrangement  has delayed  the  resolu- 
tion  of  insolvencies. 
Section  II relates  the  genesis  of  the  policy  of too 
big  to  fail.  Section  III  examines  how  it  encourages 
risk taking.  Section  IV advances  a reform  that  would 
provide  deposit  insurance  while  leaving  the  decision 
to close  a troubled  bank  to bank  creditors.  Using this 
reform  as a benchmark,  Section  V asks  whether  the 
changes  in bank  regulation  mandated  by  the  Com- 
prehensive  Deposit  Insurance  Reform  and Taxpayer 
Protection  Act  of  1991  will  ensure  that  banks  are 
closed  neither  too  soon  nor  too  late  and  that  banks 
take  neither  too  much  nor  too  little  risk. 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT  OF 
Too  BIG TO FAIL 
A.  A  Brief History  of Restrictions on Bank 
Competition 
Free  entry,  the  sine  qua  non  of  competition,  has 
never  had  the  constitutional  protection  in  banking 
that  it  has  in  other  industries.  The  Constitution 
r The  FDIC  has  argued  that  the  policy  of too  big to fail has been 
imposed  on it by statutory  restrictions  that  require  the  least  costly 
method  of resolving  a bank  failure.  Specifically,  the  FDIC  can 
economically  liquidate  a small  bank,  but  not  a large  one.  Large 
bank  failures,  consequently,  are  handled  bv  ourchase  and 
assumption  arrangements,  which  avoid  liquidation,  but  require 
the  FDIC  to  iniect  enough  funds  into  the  sale  of closed  banks 
to  restore  thei;  solvency  and  to  avoid  depositor  losses.  This 
situation  reflects  the  absence  of  a Chapter  11 arrangement  for 
banks  that  would  allow  either  the  market  or  regulators  to  close 
banks  without  forcing  immediate  liquidations. 
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their  boundaries.  The  commerce  clause  (Article  I, 
Sec.  9)  states,  “No  tax  or  duty  shall  be  laid  on 
articles  exported  from  any  state.”  In  1869,  in  Paul 
v.  Virginia,  the  Supreme  Court  extended  the  pro- 
tection  of the interstate  commerce  clause  to corpora- 
tions  by  ruling  that  a  state  could  not  exclude  an 
out-of-state  corporation  from  doing  business  in  it. 
[See  Butler  (1982),  especially  Ch.  IV.]  Banks  are 
engaged  in  commerce  in  the  sense  that  they  are 
middlemen.  They  make  money  on  the  difference 
between  the  rates  at  which  they  borrow  and  lend. 
It has never  been  acceptable  politically,  however,  to 
extend  to  banking  the  constitutional  protection  of 
free  entry  across  state  boundaries  accorded  other 
corporations.z 
The  ability  of states  to exclude  out-of-state  banks 
allowed  state  legislatures  to organize  their  intrastate 
banking  industries  into a large number  of small banks, 
each  of which  enjoyed  some  local  monopoly  power. 
Around  the  turn  of the  century,  when  the  demand 
for  banking  services  grew  in  rural  areas,  state 
legislatures  passed  laws  prohibiting  banks  from 
meeting  this  demand  through  branching.  By  1929, 
almost  all  states  had  laws  either  prohibiting  or  re- 
stricting  intrastate  branching.  Along  with  low capital 
requirements  for establishing  a bank,  the  result  was 
a banking  industry  consisting  of large numbers  of unit 
banks.  The  National  Banking  Act  included  ambig- 
uous  language  that  was  often  interpreted  as forbid- 
ding  interstate  branching  by national  banks.  In  1927, 
the  McFadden  Act  eliminated  any  ambiguity  by 
specifically prohibiting  national  banks  from branching 
across  state  lines.  As a result,  banks  could  not  diver- 
sify geographically  their  loans  and the  sources  of their 
deposits.  [For a history  of prohibitions  on branching, 
see  Mengle  (1990)]. 
Competition  in  banking  was  further  restricted 
during  the  Depression.  At  the  time,  many  blamed 
the Depression  on excessive  competition.  It appeared 
plausible  that  individual  insolvent  firms  could  be 
made  solvent  by  restricting  competition.  In  many 
industries,  consequently,  government  regulation 
attempted  to raise  prices  by restricting  competition. 
The  government  divided  financial intermediation  into 
2 Ironically,  the  European  Common  Market  is  using  the  U.S. 
federal  model  to  promote  open  competition  in  banking.  Start- 
ing  in  1993,  banks  will  be  free  to  branch  across  national  boun- 
daries.  Furthermore,  in general,  host-country  regulators  cannot 
place  any restrictions  on the  activities  of branches  of foreign banks 
not  imposed  by the  home-country  regulator.  [See Coleman  and 
Hart  (7/29/9  l).]  The  combination  of guaranteed  free  entry  and 
home-country  regulation  sharply  curtails  the  ability  of  host- 
country  regulators  to limit  competition  in the  banking  industry. 
separate  industries  that  could  not  compete  with  each 
other.  Glass-Steagall  separated  fund-raising  for  cor- 
porations  into  banking  and  securities  industries. 
Insurance  companies,  savings  and  loans,  and  credit 
unions  were  assigned  their  own  regulators  and 
spheres  of influence.  The  Banking  Act  of  1933  pro- 
hibited  the  payment  of interest  on demand  deposits, 
and  Regulation  Q  limited  the  interest  banks  could 
pay  on  time  and  savings  deposits.  Later,  the  1956 
Bank  Holding  Company  Act  restricted  the  ability  of 
banks  to  operate  nationally  through  multibank 
holding  companies.  Justice  Department  antitrust 
guidelines  restricted  competition  by  limiting  the 
ability  of  banks  to  acquire  other  banks. 
B.  Increased Competition  for Banks 
Beginning  in the  late  196Os,  innovations  in com- 
munications  and  computer  technology  eroded  re- 
strictions  on  competition  in  banking  by  making  it 
possible  for nonbank  institutions  like money  market 
mutual  funds  to  offer  bank-like  services  to  bank 
customers.  By lowering  the  cost  of bookkeeping  and 
disseminating  information,  this  technology  lessened 
the  advantage  that  banks  had  possessed  formerly  in 
gathering  deposits  and  monitoring  the  credit  risk  of 
borrowers.  The  emergence  of  new  competitors  to 
banks  has  reduced  the  viable  size  of the  traditional 
banking  industry. 
The  dramatic  increase  in competition  facing banks 
is apparent  in the  minimal  extent  to which  businesses 
relied on domestic  banks  in 1990 for additional  credit. 
Baer and Brewer  (199 1) report  the following statistics. 
In  1990,  business  credit  provided  by domestic  banks, 
finance  companies,  U.S.  branches  of foreign  banks, 
offshore  sources,  and  by  nonfinancial  commercial 
paper  grew  7.3  percent.  Domestic  banks  provided 
only  a  small  fraction,  7  percent,  of  this  growth  in 
funding.  The  year  1990  was  unusual  in  that  many 
banks  were  attempting  to  increase  their  capital-to- 
asset  ratios  by  restricting  asset  growth.  The  figures 
reflect,  however,  a  longer-run  decline  in  bank 
business  lending.  Over  the  decade  of  the  198Os, 
banks’  share  of short-  and  medium-term  lending  to 
businesses  declined  at an annual  rate  of  1.5 percent. 
Furthermore,  as  Baer  and  Brewer  point  out,  the 
market  is continuing  to develop  new  substitutes  for 
bank  lending  like  asset-backed  commercial  paper 
(backed  by  trade  receivables)  and  prime  rate  funds 
(backed  by commercial  loans).  These  sources,  which 
are  not  included  in the  above  sources,  added  about 
two  percentage  points  in  1990  to  growth  in  short- 
term  business  credit. 
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financial  innovations  eroded  regulatory  restrictions 
on  competition  in  deposit  gathering.  High  market 
rates  of interest  produced  by  high  rates  of inflation 
generated  incentives  to  escape  the  low  ceilings  on 
deposit  rates  fixed  by  Reg  Q  and  the  prohibition  of 
payment  of  interest  on  demand  deposits.  In  the 
1960s  the  Eurodollar  market  developed  as  a way 
of  allowing  large  depositors  to  put  their  deposits 
on  banks’  books  in  Europe,  where  Reg  Q  did  not 
apply.  In  the  1970s  automatic  teller  machines 
allowed  banks  to  evade  some  geographical  restric- 
tions  on  banking.  Money  market  funds  and  NOW 
accounts  allowed  depositors  with  small  accounts  to 
avoid  ceilings  on deposit  rates.  Money  market  funds 
permit  savers with  small amounts  of savings to bypass 
financial institutions  and invest  indirectly  in commer- 
cial paper,  which  is issued  only  in large  denomina- 
tions.  NOW  accounts  are  checkable  deposits  that 
evade  the  prohibition  of  payment  of  interest  on 
demand  deposits  through  the  technicality  of being 
labeled  a  savings  account. 
Banks  have  lost  their  dominant  role  not  only  as 
collectors  of relatively  cheap  funds  from  small savers 
but  also  as suppliers  of loans  to low-risk  businesses. 
Many  large  corporations  issue  commercial  paper 
directly  to financial intermediaries  like pension  funds, 
rather  than  borrow  from  banks.  By the  end  of 1989, 
money  market  funds,  with  more  than  20 million  ac- 
counts,  held  about  $455  billion  in  assets,  much  of 
it  commercial  paper.  Moreover,  the  Glass-Steagall 
Act,  which  forbids banks  from underwriting  corporate 
securities,  has  prevented  banks  from  meeting  the 
changing  needs  of their  corporate  clients  by  under- 
writing their  debt  issues.  In addition,  a variety  of firms 
not  regulated  as banks  lend  to corporations  and con- 
sumers.  Subsidiaries  owned  by  AT&T,  Ford, 
General  Electric,  and  Sears  make  commercial  loans. 
Automobile  companies  finance  car  loans  through 
financial subsidiaries.  American  Express,  AT&T,  and 
Sears  finance  consumer  loans  through  their  credit 
card  divisions. 
Regional  banks  retain  a comparative  advantage  in 
making  loans  to  companies  too  small  to  enter  the 
money  market.  They  are,  however,  losing their  com- 
parative  advantage  in gathering  deposits.  In particular, 
they  rely on deposit  insurance  as an aid in competing 
with  money  market  funds  for the  relatively  large  ac- 
counts  of  older  depositors. 
Securicization,  the  packaging  of illiquid  assets  like 
mortgages  and  car  loans  into  a security  that  can  be 
sold,  has  eroded  the  former  natural  monopoly 
possessed  by  banks  to  transform  a portfolio  of  illi- 
quid  assets  into  liquid  liabilities.  Securitization  has 
increased  the  range  of financial  intermediaries  that 
can  hold  the  illiquid  assets  formerly  held  only  by 
banks.  Pension  funds,  insurance  companies,  mutual 
funds  and  individuals  now  hold  assets  that  formerly 
were  held  chiefly  by  banks.  In  the  decade  of  the 
197Os, banks  held 34.8  percent  of the  financial assets 
of financial  intermediaries,  which  include,  in  addi- 
tion  to  banks,  other  depository  institutions, 
government-sponsored  enterprises,  insurance  com- 
panies,  pension  and  retirement  funds,  and  money 
market  and other  mutual  funds.  By  1989,  this figure 
had  fallen  to  26.6  percent  [U.S.  Treasury  (1991), 
Ch.  I,  Table  71. 
Government  policies  have  also created  competitors 
for  banks.  The  sharp  rise  of market  rates  in  1972 
in combination  with  fixed  Reg  Q  ceilings  on  time 
and  savings  deposits  produced  an  outflow  of funds 
from  thrifts  and banks.  In order  to maintain  the  flow 
of funds  to  housing  without  raising  Reg  Q  ceilings, 
the  government  expanded  the  financing  activities  of 
the  Federal  National  Mortgage  Association,  or 
“Fannie  Mae,” and the  Federal  Home  Loan  Mortgage 
Corporation,  or  “Freddie  Mac.”  Fannie  Mae  and 
Freddie  Mac  purchase  mortgages  and  then  either 
hold  them  for  their  own  account  or  package  them 
so they  can be held  by institutional  investors.  These 
federally  sponsored  credit  agencies  compete  with 
banks  and  thrifts  for  the  financing  and  warehousing 
of  mortgages. 
Tax  laws  have  placed  banks  at  a disadvantage  in 
competing  for  the  long-term  savings  of individuals. 
For  example,  certain  laws  make  some  portion  of an 
employee’s  wages  tax-exempt  if placed  in a long-term 
savings  plan  (such  as  a 401-K  plan  that  allows  the 
employee  to defer  taxes  on interest  income  from  in- 
vestments).  These  laws encourage  corporations  and 
state  and  local  governments  to  replace  banks  as 
deposit  gatherers.  Corporations  and  state  and  local 
governments  then  negotiate  directly  with pension  and 
thrift  funds.  Because  these  funds  typically  are  large 
enough  to evaluate  the  risk  of their  assets,  they  can 
hold  commercial  paper  and bonds  issued  by corpora- 
tions.  This  financial  intermediation  completely 
bypasses  banks. 
C.  The  Extension  of Deposit Insurance 
Had  the  market  forces  described  above  been  left 
unopposed,  they  would  have  forced  a contraction  of 
the  banking  industry  in the  1980s.  Contraction  was 
postponed  through  the  extension  of deposit  insurance 
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This  extension  provided  a subsidy  to banks  by lower- 
ing  their  costs  of funding  relative  to  the  costs  they 
would  have incurred  if some  holders  of their  liabilities 
had  not  been  protected  from  loss.  Too  big  to  fail 
arose  from  pressures  created  by  the  lack  of  satis- 
factory  institutional  arrangements  for  closing  banks 
rather  than  from  a conscious  decision  on the  part  of 
policymakers. 
The  FDIC  was  created  in  1933  to  protect  de- 
positors  holding  small  accounts.  It  was  not  created 
to keep  insolvent  banks  in operation.  That  task  was 
assigned  to the  Reconstruction  Fiance  Corporation. 
[See Todd  (1988),  App.  C,  and Todd  (1991).]  The 
emergence  of too  big  to  fail is recounted  in Bailout 
by  Irvine  Sprague,  a former  director  of the  FDIC. 
Sprague  recounts  the  transformation  of  the  FDIC 
from  an  agency  charged  with  covering  losses  of in- 
sured  depositors  of already failed  banks  into a modern 
day Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation  that pmwzfi 
failures by protecting  all creditors  of large banks  from 
loss.3 
Beginnings  From  1950  until  1982,  Section  13(c) 
of  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Act  allowed  the 
FDIC  to prevent  a bank  from failing if the bank  were 
judged  “essential  to  provide  adequate  banking  ser- 
vice  in  its  community.”  Sprague  points  out  that 
legislative  history  is  an  unclear  guide  to  the  in- 
tended  use  of the  “essentiality”  clause,  but  that  “this 
authority  was  not  intended  for  widespread  use” 
[Sprague  (1986),  p.  28).  Probably,  it was  included 
to prevent  the  failure  of banks  in rural  areas  served 
by  a single  bank.  In  any  event,  as  Sprague  points 
out,  the  language  effectively  gave  the  FDIC  com- 
plete  discretion  because  “the  courts  have  always 
upheld  an  agency’s  discretionary  authority.  . . . No 
challenge  has  been  successful.  So there  you  have  it. 
A bank  can  be bailed  out  if two  of three  FDIC  board 
members  determine  it should  be”  (Sprague,  p.  28). 
Since  the  passage  of  the  Garn-St.  Germain  Act  in 
1982,  the  FDIC  has  had  the  additional  authority  to 
prevent  failures  by  arranging  purchase  and  assump- 
tion  transactions  if it determines  that  liquidation  of 
the  bank  is  a  costlier  alternative. 
3 Even  when  the  too  big  to  fail doctrine  is  applied,  banks  can 
fail in that  their  charters  are revoked  and  their  stockholders  lose 
their  investments.  Too  big to fail means  that  the  FDIC  and  the 
Federal  Reserve  prevent  a lack  of funding  from  closing  large, 
troubled  banks  while  the  FDIC  arranges  a takeover  by another 
bank  (a purchase  and  assumption  transaction).  The  FDIC  sub- 
sidizes  the  takeover  so  that  bank  depositors  (uninsured  as well 
as  insured)  do  not  incur  any  losses. 
In  1971,  Unity  Bank  in  Boston  became  the  first 
bank  bailed  out  under  the  essentiality  doctrine.  One 
of  the  FDIC  directors  opposed  the  bailout  on  the 
grounds  “that  bailouts  were  bad  public  policy  and 
doing the first one would lead to many  more,  possibly 
an uncontrollable  flood” (Sprague,  p. 46).  That  direc- 
tor  was  persuaded  not  to  vote  while  the  other  two 
directors,  Sprague  and  Wille,  voted  to  keep  Unity 
afloat,  even  though  it was  mismanaged.  Unity  was 
saved  because  of  a  fear  that  the  failure  of  a  bank 
considered  to  be  a  black  institution  would  set  off 
riots  in black  neighborhoods.  Sprague  (p. 48)  notes, 
“[MJy  vote  to  make  the  ‘essentiality’  finding  and 
thus  save  the  little  bank  was  probably  foreordained, 
an  inevitable  legacy  of  [the  riots  in] Watts.”  At  the 
time,  Sprague  reports  he  believed  Unity  could  not 
set  a precedent  because  it was  “a unique  case,  one 
of  a kind”  (Sprague,  p.  49).  In  fact,  shortly  there- 
after,  the  FDIC  bailed  out  Bank  of  the  Common- 
wealth,  a large,  mismanaged  bank  in Detroit  for the 
same  reason. 
In  retrospect,  Sprague  identifies  the  bailout  of 
Unity  as the  first  step  in establishing  too  big  to  fail 
as  public  policy.  “[Tjhe  important  precedent  was, 
of  course,  the  irreversible  turn  we  had  taken  with 
Unity,  away  from  our  historic  narrow  role  of acting 
only  after  the  bank  had  failed.  .  .  .  Now  we  were 
in the  bailout business,  how deeply  no one  could then 
tell”  (Sprague,  p.  49).  Sprague  then  goes  on  to 
describe  how  over  time  too  big  to  fail  became 
embedded  in banking  regulation  through  the  prece- 
dent  of  saving  one  troubled  bank  at  a time,  rather 
than  as a result  of a conscious  decision.  By Chapter 
15 of Bailout, Sprague  says:  “Of the  fifty largest  bank 
failures  in  history,  forty-six-including  the  top 
twenty-were  handled  either  through  a pure  bailout 
or an FDIC-assisted  transaction  where  no depositor, 
insured  or  uninsured,  lost  a  penny.  In  effect,  the 
forty-six  enjoyed  100 percent  insurance  protection. 
The  four  lonely  exceptions  .  .  . were  the  result  of 
unusual  circumstances”  (Sprague,  p.  242).4 
Continental  Illinois  Because  of  its  size,  the 
bailout of Continental  Illinois exemplified  most  clearly 
the  transformation  of  the  FDIC  into  a  modern 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation.  Although 
only  10 percent  of Continental’s  deposits  were  in- 
sured,  the  FDIC  protected  all of its depositors.  [The 
4 The  major  “lonely  exception”  was. Penn  Square,  which  was 
liquidated  because  the  FDIC  believed  that  the  bank’s  negligent 
and  possibly  fraudulent  loan  practices  might  create  such  exten- 
sive  litigation  as  to  render  impossible  a purchase  and  assump- 
tion  transaction. 
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Thomson  and  Todd  (1990).]  In the  late  1970s  and 
early  198Os,  Continental  grew  rapidly  by  taking 
on  high-risk  loans.  In  particular,  Continental  pur- 
chased  $1  billion  in  oil  and  gas  loans  from  Penn 
Square,  collateralized  by drilling rigs and other  assets 
made  worthless  when  the  oil  drilling  business  col- 
lapsed.  Continental’s  downfall  began  with  the  bank- 
ruptcy  of  Penn  Square  Bank  in  Oklahoma  City  in 
July  1982.  On  May 9,  1984,  foreign  depositors  began 
to withdraw  deposits  from  Continental.  Initially,  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank of Chicago  assisted  it with  dis- 
count  window  loans,  which  eventually  totaled  $7.6 
billion. 
Because  no  buyers  could  be  found  for  Continen- 
tal, the  FDIC  decided  to keep  it in operation  through 
“open  bank  assistance.”  It  purchased  $1  billion  in 
preferred  stock  from  Continental’s  holding  company, 
which  lent  the  funds  to  Continental.  This  arrange- 
ment  amounted  to  capital  forbearance  in that  Con- 
tinental  was  allowed  to remain  in operation  with  an 
amount  of private  capital  below  regulatory  standards. 
(It  also  protected  the  creditors  of the  holding  com- 
pany,  as  well  as  the  bank.) 
Recent  Developments  Two  recent  bank  failures 
illustrate  the  blanket  coverage  extended  to uninsured 
depositors  under  the  policy  of  too  big  to  fail.  On 
August  10,  1990,  the  Comptroller  of  the 
Currency  closed  National  Bank  of Washington  and 
named  the  FDIC  as  receiver.  Because  of the  lapse 
of  time  between  the  dissemination  of  information 
about  the  bank’s  problems  and  the  closing  of  the 
bank,  depositors  at the  Nassau  branch  had  begun  to 
withdraw  funds  beginning  early  in  1990.  Discount 
window  lending  by  the  Fed  might  have  permitted 
a  sizable  portion  of  these  deposit  withdrawals. 
The  foreign  deposits  remaining  when  the  bank  was 
seized,  although  not  formally  insured  by the  FDIC, 
were  protected.  According  to  newspaper  accounts, 
the  FDIC  protected  Washington  National’s  foreign 
deposits  in  order  to  provide  assurance  to  foreign 
depositors  at money-center  banks  that  their  deposits 
were  protected  (American  Banker,  9/‘27/90).  The 
policy  of too  big  to  fail has  effectively  extended  in- 
surance  to  deposits  in  banks’  overseas  branches.5 
On January  6,  199 1, the  FDIC  took  control  of the 
Bank  of  New  England  Corporation’s  banks-Bank 
of New  England,  Connecticut  Bank  and  Trust,  and 
Maine  National  Bank.  The  FDIC’s  initial  estimate 
of the  loss was $2.3  billion  (Financial  Times,  l/8/91). 
5 By the  end  of  1990,  these  deposits  totaled  about  $300  billion 
and  amounted  to  5 1 percent  of the  deposits  of the  nine  largest 
U.S.  banks. 
Newspaper  commentary  accompanying  the  rescue 
makes  clear  how  broad  the  criteria  have  become  for 
bailing  out  a bank’s  uninsured  creditors  (Wail  Street 
JoumaL,  l/7/91): 
The  arrangement  will protect  from  loss  all depositors,  even 
those  with  accounts  exceeding  the  $100,000  insurance 
ceiling.  Mr.  Seidman  made  it clear  in an interview  that  the 
urgency  of  the  rescue  transcended  the  bank’s  difficulties. 
“We’re  looking  at an eroding  economy,  particularly  in New 
England,”  he  said.  .  .  .  Over  the  weekend,  government 
officials  stressed  the  need  to  improve  credit  conditions  in 
New  England  to  slow  economic  deterioration  there. 
At  present,  “too  big  to  fail”  appears  to  be  a 
misnomer  as even  small banks  are usually not  allowed 
to fail with a loss to uninsured  depositors.  As William 
Seidman,  former  chairman  of  the  FDIC,  noted 
(Wad  Street Jbumai,  6/S/9  1): 
Some  people  mistakenly  believe  that  small-bank  failures 
usually  are resolved  through  a payout  of insured  deposits- 
a  liquidation,  where  uninsured  depositors  and  creditors 
suffer  some  loss.  The  reality  is that,  currently,  about  nine 
out of ten  small-bank  failures are resolved  through  “purchase 
and  assumption”  transactions.  In  a  P&4  [purchase  and 
assumption  transaction],  all the  deposits  (including  those 
over  the  $100,000  insurance  limit)  generally  are  assumed 
by  a healthy  bank.  Of  the  169 banks  that  failed  in  1990, 
only 20 were  resolved  through  a payout  of insured  deposits. 
The  rest  were  resolved  through  P&As. 
While  deposit  insurance  expanded  principally 
through  growth  of the  policy  of too  big  to  fail,  ex- 
plicit  increases  in  the  size  of covered  deposits  and 
regulatory  actions  also  expanded  its  coverage. 
Regulators  used  increases  in  coverage  per  account 
to  lower  the  cost  of  funds  and  to  increase  their 
availability  to  banks  and  thrifts  when  increases  in 
market  rates  above  Reg  Q  prompted  disintermedi- 
ation.  Increases  in  coverage  per  account  coincided 
with  peaks  in market  rates:  1966,  1969,  1974,  and 
1980.  FDIC-insured  deposits  as  a fraction  of  total 
deposits  increased  from  about  55  percent  in  1965 
to more  than  70 percent  in the  1980s  [U.S. Treasury 
(1991),  Conclusions  and Recommendations,  Figures 
6  and  71. 
During  the  198Os,  the  FDIC  also  increased  the 
kinds  of bank  liabilities  protected  from  loss.  It  ex- 
tended  insurance  to the  deposits  of pension  plans  by 
“passing  through”  the  $100,000  insurance  limit  to. 
the  individual  participants  of  the  plans.  It  insured 
brokered  deposits.  6 The  FDIC  also insured  private 
6 In  1984,  the  FDIC  and  FSLIC  adopted  regulations  to  deny 
deposit  insurance  to  certificates  of  deposit  purchased  from  a 
broker.  The  regulations,  however,  were  overturned  by a federal 
court,  and  Congress  was  unwilling  to  pass  legislation  allowing 
the  regulatory  agencies  to  prohibit  brokered  certificates  of 
deposit. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  7 parties  to  swap  transactions  with  banks  in 
receivership. 
The  current  low rate  of return  to  banking  is con- 
sistent  with  the  argument  that  the  policy  of too  big 
to  fail has  kept  the  banking  industry  from  contract- 
ing  in  response  to  increased  competition.  In  the 
197Os,  the  return  on  assets  for  insured  commercial 
banks  was  .77  percent.  From  1985  to  1989,  this 
figure  fell  to  .55  percent  [U.S.  Treasury  (1991), 
Ch.  I,  Table  61. The  decline  in  the  value  of  bank 
stocks  relative  to  the  S&P  500,  which  began  in the 
late  1970s  and  became  more  pronounced  beginning 
in  1986,  reveals  investor  skepticism  about  the  future 
profitability  of the  banking  industry  given  its current 
size.  Even  with the  rally in bank  stocks  in early  199 1, 
the  P/E  ratio  of  money-center  and  large  regional 
banks  is  only  half  that  of  firms  in  the  S&P  500 
(American  Banker,  311819  1). 
D.  Pressures to Postpone  Closing 
Insolvent Banks 
Regulators  incur  a variety  of pressures  to postpone 
closing  a  troubled  bank.  Closing  a  bank  produces 
active  disapproval  from  those  affected  adversely.  In 
contrast,  beneficiaries  are  unaware  of  the  costs  in- 
directly  imposed  on them  by the  relaxation  of market 
discipline  involved  in keeping  a troubled  bank  afloat. 
Beneficiaries  include  consumers  who  benefit  from 
competition  and  potential  entrants  in  the  banking 
industry. 
The  ability  of regulatory  agencies  to  keep  open  a 
troubled  bank  inevitably  invites  political  pressures. 
Congressmen  pass  on constituent  discontent  over the 
job  losses  and  personal  disruptions  that  accompany 
the  closing  of a bank.  The  case  of the  Keating  Five 
is instructive.  Beginning  in  1987,  five  senators  ap- 
parently  intervened  with  the  Federal  Home  Loan 
Bank  Board  in  order  to  keep  Lincoln  Savings  and 
Loan  in  operation.  The  Senate  Ethics  Committee 
found  the  intervention  itself  appropriate.  The  only 
issue was whether  it was appropriate  to accept  money 
from Mr.  Keating  while intervening  on his behalf with 
federal  regulators.  In summarizing  the  report  of the 
Ethics  Committee,  Congmsional  &art&y  [Cranford 
(1991),  p.  5181  noted: 
Significantly,  the  committee  found  nothing  intrinsically 
wrong  with  the  intervention  by  these  five  senators  with 
federal  regulators  in  1987  in behalf  of Charles  H.  Keating. 
.  .  .  Each  had  ample  information  to  justify  contacting 
regulators  about  the  fairness  of  the  regulatory  treatment 
Lincoln  was  receiving.  The  case  has  hung  on  the  nexus 
between  the  five  senators’  intervention  and  the  enormous 
political  contributions  that  they  collected  from  Keating. 
Congresional  f$wztier&  [Cranford  (199 l),  p.  5 191 
also reports  Sen.  DeConcini’s  reply  to the  report  of 
the  Ethics  Committee: 
As  the  committee  effectively  acknowledges,  in early  1987 
I had  strong  reason  to believe  that  a major Arizona  company 
was  being  treated  unfairly  by  the  federal  government.  I 
further  had  reason  to  believe  that  2,000  Arizona  jobs  were 
unfairly  at  stake. 
Pressures  on  regulators  to  keep  troubled  banks 
afloat  do  not  have  to  be  political.  Regulators  may 
temporize  because  they  are  genuinely  uncertain 
whether  a bank  is insolvent.  It  is  often  difficult  to 
measure  the  market  value  of a bank’s  assets  and,  con- 
sequently,  the  market  value  of its capital.  Regulators 
want  to  be  fair,  and  they  want  to  be  perceived  as 
fair in the  media.  Given  the  ambiguity  of measures 
of capital,  they  naturally  tend  to  close  a bank  only 
when  it is clearly  insolvent.  7 Their  desire  for fairness 
presents  them  with  another  dilemma  over  troubled 
banks:  given  a  chance,  some  of  these  banks  will 
recover.  If regulators  were  to  close  a  bank  that  is 
not  obviously  insolvent,  they  would  inevitably  be  ’ 
criticized  for the  “premature  and unnecessary”  closure 
of  a bank  that  “if given  a chance,  would  make  it.” 
They  would  receive  especially  heated  criticism  from 
small  borrowers  with  special,  ongoing  relationships 
with  the  troubled  bank.8 
In  the  case  of  the  Bank  of  New  England,  the 
Comptroller  of the  Currency  only  closed  the  bank 
when  depositors  actually  began  to  run  it.  In  an 
American Banker  (l/9/9  1) article,  Comptroller  Clarke 
and  FDIC  Chairman  Seidman  were  reported  as 
having  said  that  “they  did  not  act until  last  weekend 
because  only then  was it certain  that the  Bank  of New 
England  Corp.  had no chance  to survive.”  In the  same 
article,  Karen  Shaw,  president  of  the  Institute  for 
Strategy  Development,  noted:  ‘There  was the  hope, 
even  if it was  an  errant  hope,  that  the  bank  would 
survive.  It  had  made  it  through  several  crises.” 
Rather  than  liquidate  a  large  bank  for  failure  to 
meet  a  capital  standard,  regulators  are  more  likely 
7 “Regulators,  attuned  to  the  necessities  of congressional  rela- 
tions,  and  no  more  willing  than  other  human  beings  to put  other 
people  out  of work,  will forbear  until  the  death  rattle  is clearly 
audible”  [Wallison  (1991),  p.  121. 
8 Such  criticism  is  unlikely  to  acknowledge  the  moral  hazard 
problems  of allowing  a troubled  bank  to  remain  open.  “History 
and  what  little  we  know  of human  nature  suggest  that  as  weak 
bank  managements  struggle  to  survive  they  will reach  for more 
risky  investments  to  pay  for  their  more  costly  funds,  obscure 
from  examiners  the  dangerous  condition  of  their  enterprise, 
appeal  to their  elected  representatives  as needy  constituents  and 
surrender  only when  all hope  is gone”  [Wallison  (1991),  p.  12): 
8  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1991 to  try  to  find  a  merger  partner  for  the  bank  while 
allowing  it  to  remain  in  business.  Such  partners, 
however,  are  hard  to find.  Possible  merger  partners 
have  an  incentive  to  wait  until  the  condition  of  a 
troubled  bank  deteriorates  to  the  point  where  it  is 
actually  taken  over  by  the  FDIC.  They  can  then 
negotiate  with the  FDIC.  In this way,  banks  not  only 
avoid  a possible  costly  court  fight  with  the  troubled 
bank’s  stockholders,  but  also  open  up  the  possi- 
bility  that  the  FDIC  will add  incentives  to make  the 
acquisition  more  attractive. 
An  additional  incentive  to procrastination  in clos- 
ing  a bank  is the  multiplicity  of regulators.  Under- 
standably,  each  regulator  would  like  for  the  other 
regulator  to receive  any  criticism  for closing  a bank. 
For  example,  the  Comptroller  of the  Currency  has 
the  responsibility  for declaring  national  banks  insol- 
vent.  The  Comptroller,  however,  does  not  use  its 
own  resources  to keep  a troubled  bank  afloat.  It has 
an incentive,  therefore,  to wait and hope  that  the  Fed 
will effectively  close  the  bank  by pulling  its discount 
window  loan  or  that  the  FDIC  will  close  the  bank 
by  refusing  to  grant  a waiver  for the  bank  to  attract 
insured  brokered  deposits.  Also,  state  regulators  may 
have  been  reluctant  to  revoke  the  charters  of insol- 
vent  state-chartered  banks.  Closing  down  a bank  that 
they  examine  may  appear  as an admission  of failure. 
III.  THEPROBLEMSWITH 
Too  BIG  TO  FAIL 
Restrictions  on the  ability of market  forces  to close 
banks  embodied  in the policy  of too big to fail started 
to cause  problems  when  banks  began  to experience 
significant  external  competition  in  the  1970s  and 
1980s.  The  extension  of  deposit  insurance  in  the 
form  of the  policy  of too  big  to  fail provided  a sub- 
sidy  to  banks  that  kept  the  banking  industry  from 
contracting.  It also encouraged  risk taking.  Kept from 
shrinking  by  an  extension  of the  implicit  subsidies 
of deposit  insurance,  banks  responded  to the  loss of 
low-risk  corporate  customers  by  turning  to  riskier 
investments.  Many  banks  also increased  the  subsidy 
from  deposit  insurance  by holding  riskier  asset  port- 
folios  without  increasing  their  capital. 
A.  FDIC  Insurance as a Subsidy to Risk 
Taking 
This  section  first  explains  why  government- 
sponsored  insurance  subsidizes  risk  taking  by  fail- 
ing  to  price-  risk.  The  remainder  of  the  section 
documents  the  increase  in the  riskiness  of the  bank- 
ing  system  since  the  1960s.  Banks  have  acquired 
increasingly  risky  asset  portfolios,  with  no  increase 
over  this  period  in  capital  ratios. 
Insurance  offered  by  a  private  company  pools 
individual  risks  by  establishing  a  fund  into  which 
premiums  are  paid  and  from  which  losses  are  met. 
The  insurance  company  is the  residual  claimant  on 
the  fund.  It makes  money  when  the  fund  grows  and 
loses  money  when  it declines.  For  this  reason,  the 
insurance  company  places  restrictions  on  its 
policyholders  that  limit  the  risks  they  take.  Private 
insurance  cannot  subsidize  risk  taking.  It must  price 
risk  accurately  or  go  out  of  business. 
Although  the  FDIC  uses  the term “insurance  fund,” 
its fund  is fundamentally  different  from  the  kind  of 
fund  maintained  by  a  private  insurance  company. 
With  the  FDIC  fund,  there  are  no residual  claimants 
whose  own  money  is at stake.  The  Treasury  keeps 
a tally on the  cumulative  difference  between  incom- 
ing FDIC  deposit  premia  and outgoing  FDIC  expen- 
ditures  and includes  interest  on the  positive  balance. 
This  tally  is the  FDIC  “insurance  fund.”  The  FDIC 
fund  can  be  depleted,  but  it  cannot  become  insol- 
vent.  If the  current  receipts  from  the  premia  paid  by 
banks  are  insufficient  to cover  current  FDIC  expen- 
ditures,  then  FDIC  deposit  insurance  commits  the 
taxpayer  to pay  the  difference.  It is this commitment 
that  allows  deposit  insurance  to be used  to subsidize 
risk  taking. 
In contrast  to a private  insurance  arrangement  that 
limits  risk  taking,  FDIC  insurance  encourages  risk 
taking.  The  subsidy  banks  receive  from the guarantee 
of their  deposits  by  the  government  increases  with 
the  riskiness  of their  asset  portfolio  and  decreases 
with  the  amount  of capital  they  hold.  FDIC  deposit 
insurance  does  not lower the cost  of funds appreciably 
for a conservatively  managed,  highly capitalized  bank, 
but  it does  for a risk-taking,  poorly  capitalized  bank. 
Both  kinds  of banks  pay  the  same  flat rate  on  their 
insured  deposits.9 
The  encouragement  given  by deposit  insurance  to 
risk  taking  was  kept  in check  as long  as restrictions 
9 In principle,  risk-based  capital  guidelines  can  offset  the  incen- 
tives  deposit  insurance  creates  for  risk  taking.  In  practice, 
however,  such  guidelines  are  hard  to  implement.  They  assign 
risk  on the  basis  of broad  categories,  which  do  not  differentiate 
between  riskiness  of assets  within  categories.  Also,  it  is  often 
hard  to defend  the  relative  assessment  oj risk  across  categories. 
For  examole.  the  1988 Basle  Aareements  on  risk-based  capital 
guidelines’  stipulate  that  mortgaie-backed  securities,  which  are 
often  subject  to  significant  risk  from  interest  rate  fluctuations, 
require  only one-fifth  the  capital  of a commercial  loan. The  most 
important  drawback  to risk-based  capital guidelines  is their  failure 
to  reward  risk  reduction  through  asset  diversification. 
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A  high  franchise  value  acts  like  a  large  amount  of 
capital.  It limits risk taking  because  stockholders  bear 
significant  losses  if the  bank  fails. Increased  competi- 
tion  in banking,  however,  has  eroded  the  franchise 
value  of banks,  especially  since  the  1970s  [Keeley 
(1990)]. 
B.  Evidence of Increased Risk in the 
Banking System 
Deposit  insurance  has allowed  the  banking  industry 
to pursue  riskier  investment  strategies  in the  1980s 
without  increasing  its  capital.  In  the  early  196Os, 
insured  commercial  banks  had  a ratio  of  capital  to 
total  assets  of about  8 percent.iO  In  the  198Os,  this 
ratio  fell  to  about  6  percent  [U.S.  Department  of 
Commerce  (1965),  Table  607,  and U.S.  Department 
of  Commerce  (1985),  Table  8261.  The  6  percent 
aggregate  figure  conceals  significant  variation  among 
banks.  At year-end  1989,  the  largest  25  banks  had 
a ratio  of capital  to  assets  of only  4.8  percent  [U.S. 
Treasury  (199 l),  Ch.  II, Table  21. Barth,  Brumbaugh 
and  Litan  (1990,  Table  3)  report  that,  as  of June 
1990,  183  banks  with  assets  of $11.2  billion  were 
operating  with  capital-to-assets  ratios  of less  than  3 
percent.  An additional  67 banks  with combined  assets 
of  $80  billion  had  capital-to-assets  ratios  between 
3  and  3.5  percent. 
There  is  also  evidence  that,  for  troubled  banks, 
capital  based  on the  book  value  of assets  overstates 
capital  based  on market  values.  Using  cross  section 
data  to  study  the  relationship  between  book  and 
market  values,  Mengle  (1991,  p.  2 1)  finds  that, 
among  banks  that failed, capital  based  on book  values 
significantly  overstated  capital  based  on  market 
values.  Mengle  (1991,  p.  19)  also  notes: 
Failures  are far  more  common  than  book  value  insolvency 
numbers  would  suggest;  in any  given  year,  the  number  of 
failures  far outstrips  the  number  of book  value  insolvencies 
in  either  the  current  or  the  previous  year.  .  .  .  only  6 
percent  of  the  banks  that  failed  in  1985  had  reported 
themselves  to  be  book  value  insolvent  in  1985. 
Moreover,  the  stock  market  values  many  banks 
less  highly  than  the  book  value  of  their  capital. 
Barth,  Brumbaugh,  and  Litan  (199 1, Table  6) show 
that  for  20 of the  25  largest  U.S.  banks,  the  market 
value  of  their  equity  is  less  than  the  book  value. 
While  the  ratio  of  book  capital  to  assets  has 
changed  very  little  for the  banking  system  over  the 
lo At  the  time,  this  capital  ratio  was  adequate  because  restric- 
tions  on competition  made  banking  relatively  safe.  The  absence 
of any change  in the  bank  prime  rate  from August  1960 through 
December  1965  used  to  be  cited  as  evidence  of  the  carteli- 
zation  of banking. 
last two decades,  banks’ asset  portfolios  have  become 
riskier.  The  loss  of blue  chip  corporate  customers 
to the  commercial  paper  market  left remaining  bank 
loan  portfolios  riskier.  Particularly  since  the 
mid-1980s  bank  lending  has  been  concentrated  in 
high-risk  categories.  From  1985  through  1990,  65 
percent  of  the  increase  in  bank  loans  was  in  real 
estate.  Of the  increase  in real  estate  lending  during 
this  period,  43.5  percent  was  in  commercial  real 
estate  [Board  of  Governors  (March  1991),  Table 
1.25,  “Assets  and  Liabilities  of Commercial  Banks” 
and  Board  of  Governors  (December  1991),  Table 
1.54,  “Mortgage  Debt  Outstanding”].  Banks  pur- 
chased  large amounts  of mortgage-backed  securities, 
which  present  considerable  interest  rate  risk,  and 
became  heavily involved  in off-balance  sheet  activities 
such  as  loan  commitments  and  standby  letters  of 
credit,  In  dollar  terms,  these  latter  activities  grew 
from  58  percent  of  assets  in  1982’to  116  percent 
in  1989  [U.S.  Treasury  (1991),  Ch.  I,  p.  271. 
The  increase  in the  riskiness  of bank  asset  port- 
folios  could  not  have  occurred  without  the  subsidy 
to  risk  taking  provided  by  deposit  insurance.  Con- 
sider  the  contrasting  management  of  the  banks 
described  in  the  following  quotations: 
Long  dependent  on  a regional  economy  that  rises  and  falls 
with  the  auto  industry’s  swings,  banks  in  the  region  [Mid- 
west]  rarely  stray  far  from  the  basics  of opening  checking 
accounts,  backing  small businesses  and managing  trust  funds. 
Economic  uncertainty  has  generally  kept  them  from  seeking 
quick  gains  through  risky  loans  to  commercial  developers, 
junk  bond  artists  or Third  World  nations  (Wu~Stmt.hnza~, 
4/11/91). 
Each  week,  Walter  Connolly  [head  of  the  Bank  of  New 
England  Corp.]  would  survey  the  numbers  from  his banking 
empire,  450  branches  that  stretched  from  the  top  to  the 
bottom  of New  England.  If the  numbers  didn’t  look  right- 
if a  bank  had  lost  even  a  bit  of  market  share-Connolly 
would  get  the  bank’s  president  on  the  phone  and  demand 
to know  what  had  happened.  No  matter  what  he  was  told, 
he  had  the  same  answer:  “Grow  it,  grow  it.”  “The  whole 
culture  was  one  of  growth,”  said  Donald  J.  Kauth.  .  .  . 
“Size  was  success  to  Walter,”  said  one  colleague.  “He 
wanted  to  retire  as  the  chairman  of  the  biggest  bank  in 
Boston”  (Washington  Post,  119191). 
Deposit  insurance  subsidizes  the  risk-taking  bank, 
not  the  conservatively  managed  bank.  In particular, 
deposit  insurance  makes  it  possible  for  a  bank  to 
finance  rapid  growth  with  cheap  deposits  even  if that 
growth  is achieved  by acquiring  low quality  and  risky 
assets. 
C.  Systemic Risk 
The  policy  of too  big  to  fail is often  defended  as 
a  response  to  inherent  instability  in  the  banking 
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namely,  that  deposit  insurance  and the  policy  of too 
big  to  fail  have  created  instability  in  the  banking 
system. 
Because  too big to fail entails  closing banks  without 
imposing  losses  on  depositors,  there  is an  ongoing 
possibility  that  the  FDIC  will have  to  ask Congress 
for funds  to close  insolvent  banks.”  The  regressive 
character  of the  wealth  transfers  involved  in bailing 
out  the  creditors  of large  banks,  however,  makes  it 
difficult  for  Congress  to  appropriate  funds  for  the 
FDIC.  The  ongoing  possibility  of a need  for  addi- 
tional  funding  to operate  the  FDIC,  combined  with 
the  uncertainties  surrounding  the  congressional 
appropriations  process,  creates  a  potential  for 
systemic  instability.  In a situation  where  many  banks 
are poorly  capitalized,  a run on a large  bank  at a time 
when  the  deposit  insurance  fund  is depleted  could 
cause  bank  runs  to  spread  uncontrollably.  Under 
current  institutional  arrangements,  therefore, 
regulators  must  maintain  control  over  the  timing  of 
the  closing  of  insolvent  banks.  This  control  can 
only  be  achieved  by protecting  all creditors  of banks 
(including  uninsured  depositors)  from  loss.  Current 
institutional  arrangements  make  too  big  to  fail  an 
imperative. 
Too  big  to  fail,  however,  is  part  of  a  vicious 
circle.  Protecting  all creditors  from  loss limits  incen- 
tives  for  creditors  to  monitor  the  riskiness  of bank 
asset  portfolios.  Banks  can  then  hold  only  minimal 
amounts  of capital  while  making  risky  investments 
without  increasing  the  rate  they  pay  on  deposits. 
This  behavior,  however,  creates  precisely  the 
weakness  in the  banking  system  that  makes  too  big 
to fail appear  to be  an imperative.  Ironically,  deposit 
insurance  has produced  the  systemic  instability  it was 
supposed  to  prevent. 
ii  At  present,  the  FDIC  possesses  only  a  limited  ability  to 
generate  additional  revenue  through  increases  in  the  premium 
it levies  on  deposits.  Additional  premium  increases  will reduce 
the  ability  of  banks  to  compete  with  other  financial  inter- 
mediaries.  Banks  are already  subject  to the  special  tax imposed 
by noninterest-bearing  reserve  requirements.  In the past,  required 
reserves  and  FDIC  deposit  premia  have  collected  similar 
amounts  of  revenue.  For  example,  in  December  1990, 
depository  institutions  held  $57.5  billion  in  required  reserves, 
and  the  three-month  Treasury  bill rate  was  6.8  percent.  At  an 
annual  rate,  the  reserve  requirement  tax  was  collecting  $3.9 
billion  in  revenue  (068  x  $57.5).  In  1989,  FDIC  assessment 
income  came  to  $3.5  billion. 
-. 
IV. THEWORLDWITHOUT 
Too  BIGTO  FAIL 
A. The  New  Legislation 
The  policy  of too  big  to  fail resulted  in part  from 
a lack  of satisfactory  institutional  arrangements  for 
closing  insolvent  banks  in  a timely  way.  The  1991 
Deposit  Insurance  Reform  Act  addresses  the  prob- 
lem of timely  closure  by requiring  regulators  to close 
a bank  when  its capital  falls below  a specified  level. 
[The  Shadow  Financial  Regulatory  Committee 
(1988)  has  been  the  primary  proponent  of  this 
approach.] 
The  new  act  requires  bank  regulators  to establish 
five  capital  categories:  well  capitalized,  adequately 
capitalized,  undercapitalized,  significantly  under- 
capitalized,  and critically undercapitalized.  It requires 
regulators  to classify as critically  undercapitalized  any 
bank  with  a capital-to-assets  ratio of 2 percent  or less. 
Regulators  must  close  such  a bank  within  90  days. 
Furthermore,  the  act  legislates  a  list  of  strictures 
that  bank  regulators  must  impose  on  banks  in  the 
undercapitalized  and  significantly  undercapitalized 
categories. 
The  mandatory  early  intervention  written  into the 
new  law  probably  derived  from  the  political  diffi- 
culty  in  introducing  market  discipline  by  explicitly 
limiting  deposit  insurance.r2  The  law  intends  that 
regulators  close  troubled  banks  before  insured 
deposits  are  put  at  risk.  Consequently,  the  FDIC 
would  not  have  to  absorb  a loss  when  a bank  fails. 
It follows that  the new  law should  remove  the  former 
subsidy  to risk  taking  created  by deposit  insurance. 
Its  intent  is to  make  deposit  insurance  superfluous 
without  explicitly  limiting  or  repealing  it. 
Will  the  Deposit  Insurance  Reform  Act  end  the 
policy  of too  big  to fail through  the  prompt  closing 
of troubled  banks?  Will  banks  begin  to  assume  an 
optimal  amount  of risk?  Answering  these  questions 
requires  a benchmark  against  which  the  legislation 
can be judged.  This  benchmark  is taken  to be a bank- 
ing system  in which  market  discipline  controls  both 
the  closure  decision  and  the  riskiness  of bank  asset 
portfolios.  How  would  such  a  system  work? 
B.  Market Closure 
Such  a system  could  apply  the  arrangements  for 
corporate  bankruptcy  to the  banking  industry.  Under 
iz Direct  attempts  to  limit  deposit  insurance,  such  as  reducing 
the  $100.000  deoosit  limit.  limitine  the  number  of  allowable 
accounts  per  hou’sehold,  and  provid%g  for  a depositor  deduct- 
ible,  proved  too  controversial  to  include  in  the  new  law. 
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decision  of troubled  firms  is  approximately  right.i3 
Although  much  of corporate  bankruptcy  law would 
not  be  applicable,  it  would  be  possible  to  recreate 
its  major  features  for  banks.  First,  bankruptcy  law 
provides  a market  mechanism  for  placing  corpora- 
tions  in receivership.  That  is,  the  decision  to place 
a  corporation  in  receivership  is  made  by  a  firm’s 
creditors  or  management  rather  than  by  public 
officials. Second,  corporations  in receivership  are not 
allowed  to fail catastrophically.  Chapter  11 allows  a 
bankrupt  corporation  to continue  in operation  while 
it  is  either  reorganized  or  liquidated  in  an  orderly 
fashion.  Third,  bankruptcy  law  provides  a rule  for 
apportioning  losses  among  a firm’s creditors.  Fourth, 
although  insolvent  corporations  are  not  liquidated 
abruptly,  they  are not  kept  in operation  with govern- 
ment  money.  The  individuals  involved  have  the 
necessary  incentives  to close  institutions  that  are not 
viable. 
These  features  of corporate  bankruptcy  law could 
be  approximated  for banks.14  First,  the  policy  of too 
big to fail could be eliminated  by rescinding  the  ability 
of any government  agency  to offer guarantees  to bank 
creditors,  including  depositors.  Bank  creditors  then 
would  have  their  own  money  at risk in a bank  failure. 
Analogous  to  corporate  bankruptcy,  bankruptcy  of 
a  bank  would  be  triggered  by  failure  to  honor  an 
obligation  for  payment.  is  Second,  a  petition  for 
bankruptcy  would  put  a  bank  into  the  kind  of 
receivership  provided  for, by Chapter  11 in corporate 
bankruptcy.  Third,  when  a bank  went  into  receiver- 
ship  its  depositors  would  incur  an  immediate  loss 
(haircut)  on the  amount  of their  deposits  at the  close 
of  the  day  preceding  the  bankruptcy  decision.16 
Regulators  would  set  the  size  of the  loss  so that  the 
failed  bank  would  again  possess  positive  net  worth. 
Apart  from  the  haircut,  depositors  would  have  com- 
plete  access  to their  funds,  unlike  creditors  in a cor- 
porate  bankruptcy.  Fourth,  if  necessary,  banks  in 
receivership  could  obtain  new  funds  from  debtor-in- 
possession  financing,  that  is, financing  in which  new 
lenders  receive  priority  in repayment  over  existing 
holders  of  subordinated  debt. 
ia Dotsey  and  Kuprianov  (1990)  discuss  relevant  issues  in  the 
context  of the  problems  with  the  S&L  industry  in  the  1980s. 
I4 A  detailed  proposal  is  available  from  the  author. 
1s Although  creditors  could  petition  a bankruptcy  court  to close 
a bank  that  did not  honor  its debts,  most  petitions  for bankruptcy 
would  probably  be  voluntary  petitions  by  bank  management 
made  to  stop  an  incipient  run. 
I6 The  American  Banker’s  Association  (1990)  and  Boyd  and 
Rolnick  (1988)  have  advocated  depositor  haircuts. 
C.  A  Proposal  to Restructure 
Deposit  Insurance 
The  provision  of  a  Chapter  11  arrangement  for 
banks,  which  would  ensure  that  banks  never  failed 
abruptly,  would  protect  the  payments  system.  The 
issue  remains,  however,  of whether  allowing  bank 
depositors  to  close  a  bank  through  a  run  could 
precipitate  a  system-wide  run.  In  particular, 
economists  differ  over  whether  the  ability  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  to undertake  large-scale  open  market 
purchases  of securities  to supply  reserves  to the bank- 
ing  system  would  be  sufficient  to  prevent  a general 
run  of the  banking  system.17  This  issue  is likely  to 
remain  contentious.  A system  of deposit  insurance, 
however,  could  be  designed  that  would  keep  the 
closure  decision  in the  hands  of bank  creditors  while 
still  protecting  against  bank  panics.  Deposit  insur- 
ance,  which  currently  is  an  entitlement  granted 
whenever  a bank  creates  a deposit,  could  be  fixed 
in  quantity  and  priced  by  the  market. 
Specifically,  the  Treasury  would  auction  deposit 
insurance  certificates  to banks,  which  would  sell them 
to  depositors  desiring  to  insure  their  deposits.  The 
amount  of these  certificates,  however,  would  be  kept 
less  than  the  total  deposits  in the  banking  system. 
In  addition,  individual  banks  would  be  able  to  offer 
insurance  certificates  only  up  to  a fraction  of  their 
total  deposits.  In this way,  all banks  would  have  some 
depositors  genuinely  at risk in the  event  of a failure.‘* 
An  advantage  of this  proposal  is that  it is agnostic 
on  the  issue  of  whether  instability  is  an  inherent 
feature  of banking.  On  the  one  hand,  if policymakers 
believe  that  the banking  system  is prone  to instability, 
they  can  maintain  permanently  a relatively  high  ratio 
of deposit  insurance  certificates  relative  to  the  total 
deposits  of the  banking  system.  On  the  other  hand, 
I7 Anna  Schwartz  argues  that  it would.  She  observes  (personal 
communication  to  the  author):  “There  were  runs  before  the 
public  could  confidently  count  on  a lender  of last  resort  to  nip 
them  in the  bud.  I keep  asking  why  Britain  had  its  last  run  on 
banks  in  1866,  but  the  U.S.  continued  to  experience  them 
until  1933.  In the  first  case,  the  lender  of last  resort  had  learned 
what  to  do  to prevent  a run,  and  the  public  knew  it.”  Diamond 
and  Dybvig  (1983),  in  contrast,  construct  a model  in which  in 
principle  it  is  possible  to  have  bank  runs  that  would  not  be 
offset  by  open  market  purchases. 
I* For  example,  assume  a depositor  has  $20,000  in deposits  at 
the  time  his bank  enters  bankruptcy  court  and  $15,000  in deposit 
insurance  certificates.  Assume  also that  depositors  receive  a hair- 
cut  of  5 percent.  The  depositor,  then,  receives  a haircut  of  5 
percent  on the  $5,000  of deposits  not  covered  by his certificates. 
When  a  bank  is  placed  into  bankruptcy  and  its  depositors 
incur  haircuts,  the  bank  submits  the  deposit  insurance  certificates 
registered  with  it  to  the  Treasury.  The  Treasury  becomes  a 
claimant  on  the  failed  bank  for  an  amount  equal  to  the  per- 
centage  haircut  applied  to  the  bank’s  certificates. 
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banking  system  is through  market  discipline  that gives 
individual  banks  an  incentive  to  hold  high  levels  of 
capital  and  limit  risk  taking.  They  could  then  gradu- 
ally  eliminate  the  certificates. 
V.  BANKCLOSURE  ANDRISKTAKING 
WITH THENEWLEGISLATION 
Under  the  new  law,  how  well  will  regulators 
approximate  the  results  that  would  be  achieved  by 
competitive  market  forces?  Will  troubled  banks 
be closed  neither  prematurely  nor tardily? Will banks 
take  the  right  amount  of risk,  neither  too  much  nor 
too  little? 
A.  Optimal Closure 
The  new  law  continues  to  rely  heavily  on  the 
discretion  of government  regulators.  Regulators  still 
decide  when  to write  down  the  book  value of a bank’s 
assets  and,  as  a  consequence,  when  to  lower  the 
credit  category  into  which  a bank  falls.  Fear  of trig- 
gering  a run  could  still make  regulators  reluctant  to 
downgrade  a  large  banks  capital  category. 
Alternatively,  the  new  law  could  create  political 
pressure  to close  troubled  banks  prematurely.  It gives 
regulators  a whole  arsenal  of weapons  for limiting risk 
and  restricting  the  activities  of troubled  banks.  If a 
bank  does  fail with  a  significant  loss  to  the  FDIC, 
bank  regulators  could  easily  be  accused  of negligent 
supervision.19  In  order  to  avoid  the  criticism  of 
negligence,  regulators  might  write  down  the  book 
value  of a bank’s  assets  at any  sign of trouble.  In the 
spirit  of the  new  law,  they  might  take  strong  action 
against  any  bank  whose  capital  falls below  even  the 
most  conservative  capital  categories. 
B.  Optimal Risk Taking 
Even  if banks  are closed  promptly  when  the  book 
value  of  their  capital  falls  below  2  percent,  losses 
to  the  deposit  insurance  fund  may  remain  large. 
Limiting  losses  to the  insurance  fund will also require 
limiting  the  riskiness  of bank  asset  portfolios.  The 
new legislation leaves uncertain  whether  limiting bank 
risk wilI occur through  imposition  of market  discipline 
or  through  regulator  intervention. 
I9 Pratt’s  Lener  (December  20,  1991)  commented:  “When 
Senate  Banking  Committee  Chairman  Riegle  prematurely  (and 
unjustly)  dispatched  Comptroller  Clarke  to regulatory  boot  hill, 
he  delivered  a powerful  message  of his  own:  Mess  up  and  I’ll 
have  your  head.  And  now  that  Congress  has  legislatively  signed 
what  it  perceives  to  be  a $9.5 billion  check  for  the  FDIC  and 
RTC,  its proclivity  for the  Riegle-style  witch  hunt  will increase.” 
Consider,  in this  regard,  the  failure  on August  10, 
1990,  of  National  Bank  of  Washington  (discussed 
earlier).  National  Bank  of Washington  was  the  sec- 
ond  bank  closed  under  the  powers  granted  by  the 
Financial  Institution  Reform,  Recovery,  and Enforce- 
ment  Act  of  1989.  These  powers  allow  regulators 
to  seize  a  bank  before  it  becomes  insolvent.  On 
March  3 1,  1990,  the bank  had a capital-to-assets  ratio 
of 5 percent  (Consolidated  Reports  of Condition  and 
Income).  When  seized  four months  later,  it still had 
a capital-to-assets  ratio  of  1.4 percent.  Measured  by 
the  book  value  of  its  assets,  it was  solvent.  When 
National  Bank  of Washington  was  closed  and  sold 
to Riggs  National  Bank,  however,  the  FDIC  had  to 
retain  $539  million  in  its  assets,  one-third  of  the 
bank’s  $1.6  billion  in  assets.  The  FDIC’s  initial 
estimate  of its loss was $500  million (American  Banker, 
9/27/90).  National  Bank  of Washington  was  in fact 
deeply  insolvent  when  it  was  closed. 
The  new  law  requires  regulators  to  close  within 
90  days  a  bank  with  a  capital-to-assets  ratio  of  2 
percent  or less.  The  experience  with  National  Bank 
of Washington,  which  was closed  when  it had  a book 
value  capital  ratio  of  1.4  percent,  suggests  that  the 
new  law  will  not  necessarily  prevent  failures  that 
impose  heavy  losses  on  the  FDIC. 
A study  by Alton  Gilbert  (1992,  Table  4) of 1,000 
banks  that  failed  since  1985  puts  the  average  loss 
ratio  at 27 percent  (the  loss  to the  FDIC  divided  by 
the  book  value  of  the  failed  bank’s  assets).  Under 
the  system  of bank  regulation  that  existed  prior  to 
the Deposit  Insurance  Reform  Act, the  standard  prac- 
tice was for regulators  to close  banks  when  their book 
capital-to-assets  ratio  reached  0  percent.  With  the 
passage  of the  new  act,  they  will close  banks  when 
this  ratio  reaches  2 percent.  Given  the  magnitude 
of the  historic  loss ratio,  27 percent,  the  change  from 
0  to  2  percent  should  not  be  expected  to  have  a 
significant  effect  in  reducing  FDIC  losses. 
Two  other  changes  in the  regulatory  regime  could, 
however,  keep  FDIC  losses  small in the future.  First, 
the  public  could  come  to  believe  that  federal 
regulators  will  allow  large  banks  to  fail with  losses 
to uninsured  depositors.  Uninsured  depositors  would 
then  begin  to  exert  a discipline  on  bank  risk  taking 
by  demanding  a return  on  their  deposits  commen- 
surate  with  the  riskiness  of banks’  portfolios.  Market 
discipline  would  force  banks  to  price  risk  correctly 
by  imposing  higher  interest  rates  on  the  uninsured 
deposits  of banks  with  risky  asset  portfolios.  Cor- 
rect pricing  by banks  would  limit the  riskiness  of their 
asset  portfolios. 
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into  limiting  bank  risk.  Because  of the  difficulties  in 
evaluating  risk,  this involvement  would  probably  take 
the  form  of  relatively  crude  quantitative  limits  on 
different  kinds  of investments.  Attempts  by regulators 
to  restrict  the  riskiness  of  bank  asset  portfolios, 
however,  could prevent  banks  from  allocating  capital 
efficiently  by balancing  risk and return.  Reducing  the 
riskiness  of bank  assets  is not  an  end  in itself.  After 
all,  banks  exist  because  of the  need  to  make  risky 
loans. They  are financial intermediaries  that  specialize 
in  pricing  risk  and  monitoring  risky  lending.  If 
regulators  are drawn  into this  second  alternative,  they 
could  greatly  harm  the  banking  industry’s  ability  to 
extend  credit  efficiently. 
VI.  CONCLUDINGCOMMENT 
The  new  legislation  may remove  most  of the  sub- 
sidy  offered  by  deposit  insurance.  Increases  in  the 
deposit  insurance  premium  levied  by the  FDIC  could 
even  turn  deposit  insurance  into  a net  tax.  If implicit 
subsidies  in deposit  insurance  kept  banking  from con- 
tracting  in  the  198Os,  then  the  new  legislation,  by 
removing  these  subsidies,  will  precipitate  a  con- 
traction  of  banking.  The  contraction  may  be  par- 
ticularly  severe  among  large banks  that  lost corporate 
customers  to  the  commercial  paper  market  in  the 
1980s.  The  difficulties  in achieving  optimal  closure 
and  risk  taking  in  banking  discussed  above  are 
likely  to  be  exacerbated  by  the  need  for  the  bank- 
ing  industry  to  contract.  This  contraction  could  be 
impeded  by  the  tendency  of  failed  banks  to  be 
merged  rather  than  closed  and by legal restraints  that 
prevent  banks  from  diversifying  freely  into  other 
financial  and  commercial  activities. 
Banking  is  still  different  from  other  industries. 
There  is no  active.market  for  corporate  control  in 
which  raiders  can  acquire  a  bank  and  shrink  it. 
There  is  no  market-driven  bankruptcy  procedure. 
Consequently,  there  is  no  market  mechanism  to 
assure  efficient  shrinkage  of  the  banking  industry. 
It is important  that  this  problem  be  understood  and 
publicly  debated. 
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